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INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA) to protect places of “historical, architectural, or cultural
significance at the community, State or regional level . . . against
1
the force of the wrecking ball.” One of the major impacts of the
NHPA has been to incorporate consideration of historic resources
2
into federal agency planning through section 106 of the Act.
3
Although section 106 is procedural in nature, the outcome of its
assessment process can influence a federal agency’s decision to
4
either deny a permit application or prescribe mitigation measures.
The NHPA’s protections extend beyond the Western concept
of historic sites as relics of a distant past, to a more expansive
recognition of traditional cultural properties (TCPs): sites that play
a major role in a culture’s historically rooted beliefs, customs, and
5
practices. American Indian tribes sometimes utilize TCP
designations to protect culturally significant places, including sites
6
that are important for religious ceremonies or for hunting, fishing,
7
or gathering. The NHPA requires tribal consultation as part of the
section 106 process to help ensure that impacts on TCPs are
8
considered.
1. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1916 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3307, 3309.
Although this is a strong statement of policy, the legislative history also emphasizes
a “meaningful balance . . . between preservation . . . and new construction.” See id.
2. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 106,
80 Stat. 915, 917 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012)).
3. See Neighborhood Ass’n of the Back Bay, Inc. v. Fed. Transit Admin.,
463 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 2006).
4. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Protecting Pocahontas’s World: The Mattaponi
Tribe’s Struggle Against Virginia’s King William Reservoir Project, 36 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 1, 74–76 (2012) (describing a permit denial that was later reversed); Thomas
F. Thornton, Anatomy of a Traditional Cultural Property: The Saga of Auke Cape,
26 GEO. WRIGHT F. 71 (2009).
5. See PATRICIA L. PARKER & THOMAS F. KING, NAT’ L PARK SERV., GUIDELINES
FOR EVALUATING AND DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES 1 (1990,
rev. 1998) [hereinafter BULLETIN 38].
6. See, e.g., Jack F. Trope, Existing Federal Law and the Protection of Sacred Sites:
Possibilities and Limitations, 19 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 1995, at 30.
7. See, e.g., Alice Walker & Greg de Bie, Lake Powell Pipeline Project: Traditional
Cultural Properties Designation and the Protection of Kaibab Paiute Tribal Resources, in
FEDERAL REGULATION OF CULTURAL RESOURCES, WILDLIFE , AND WATERS OF THE
U.S. 5-1 (2012).
8. Protection of Historic Properties, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,698, 77,698 (proposed
Dec. 12, 2000) (final rule codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. § 800 (2013)).
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In practice, federal agencies vary in their implementation of
9
section 106. This is at least partly influenced by the different legal
10
mandates and activities of the various federal agencies.
Additionally, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP
11
or “Council”), which was created to administer the NHPA, allows
other agencies to promulgate their own section 106 regulations as
12
long as they get Council approval. These regulations may
13
effectively replace the ACHP’s regulations.
The Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) promulgated its own
14
section 106 regulations in the 1980s. The Corps’ regulations are
15
problematic, particularly for tribes. They significantly limit the
16
scope of historic and cultural resource analysis under the NHPA,
17
limit opportunities for tribal consultation, and conflict with the
18
NHPA’s recognition of traditional cultural properties.
Furthermore, the Corps’ reliance on its own regulations
exceeds its statutory and regulatory authority. The Corps’
regulations are out of compliance with the ACHP’s regulations for
two reasons: (1) they conflict with the ACHP’s regulations in
19
significant respects, and (2) the Corps has not obtained ACHP
20
approval. Even if the ACHP did approve the Corps’ regulations,
9.
FOR THE

See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., CARING FOR THE PAST, M ANAGING
FUTURE : FEDERAL STEWARDSHIP AND AMERICA’ S HISTORIC LEGACY 15–18

(2001).
10. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE , GAO/RCED-88-81,
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPROVED
(1988), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/146614.pdf.
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470i, 470j (2012).
12. 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(a) (2013).
13. Id.; Protection of Historic Properties, 65 Fed. Reg. at 77,723 (“The
procedures would substitute in whole or in part for the Council’s section 106
regulations. As procedures, they would include formal Agency regulations, but
would also include departmental or Agency procedures that do not go through
the formal rulemaking process.”).
14. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C
(2013)).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.A–C.
17. See infra Part IV.D–E.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
163 F. Supp. 2d 776, 792 (N.D. Ohio 2001); Tom King, The Corps of Engineers
Needs an Appendectomy, TOM KING’ S CRMPLUS (Dec. 24, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://
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such a regulatory delegation exceeds the ACHP’s authority under
21
the NHPA. This article suggests possible fixes to the Corps’
procedures to resolve these inconsistencies and the resulting legal
22
uncertainty. It concludes that a repeal of the Corps’ regulations is
necessary to bring the agency’s practices back in line with the
23
historic preservation mandate of the NHPA.
II. THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT
A. The Framework of the NHPA
Although statutory protections for historic places have existed
24
since the early twentieth century, in the wake of post–World War
II development, it became apparent that these protections were
25
inadequate. The NHPA incorporated consideration of historic
and cultural resources into federal agency planning, and it remains
26
the cornerstone of federal protections for historic places today.
The NHPA establishes the National Register of Historic Places,
27
a list of historically and culturally important sites. Federal
agencies are directed to establish preservation programs that
crmplus.blogspot.com/2011/12/corps-of-engineers-needs-appendectomy.html
(“The [ACHP] and the National Park Service . . . have regularly advised the Corps
that [its section 106 regulation is] not worth the paper it’s written on.”).
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part VI.
23. See infra Part VII.
24. See Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225, 225 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2012)) (authorizing the President to set aside
national monuments); Historic Sites Act of 1935, ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666, 666–668
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461–467) (authorizing the Secretary of
Interior to establish the National Historic Landmark Program).
25. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 1(c),
80 Stat. 915, 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(5)) (“[I]n the face of
ever-increasing extensions of urban centers, highways, and residential,
commercial, and industrial developments, the present governmental and
nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities are inadequate.”);
THOMAS F. KING, FEDERAL PLANNING AND HISTORIC PLACES: THE SECTION 106
PROCESS 15–16 (2000).
26. Walter E. Stern & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources
and Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development: A Practical Primer, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 133, 136 (1995).
27. See National Historic Preservation Act § 101, 80 Stat. at 915–916 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)). A list of properties on the National Register is
available at http://www.nps.gov/history/nr/research.
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identify properties eligible for the National Register and plan for
28
the protection of those properties. Furthermore, section 106 of
the NHPA mandates that federal agencies consider impacts on sites
included on or eligible for the National Register before issuing a
29
permit or expending federal funds on a project.
30
The NHPA created the ACHP to oversee the section 106
31
review process. Section 106 mandates that federal agencies “afford
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation . . . a reasonable
opportunity to comment with regard to [federal]
32
undertaking[s].”
Congress also charged the ACHP with
33
rulemaking authority under the NHPA.
B.

From Historic Architecture to Traditional Cultural Properties: Bulletin
38

Even though many historic sites are uniquely significant to
American Indians, the original framework of section 106 did not
effectively include tribes, causing many historic sites to be
34
overlooked. Places of historic significance to tribes are often more
than vestiges of a remote past; rather, they are places where Indians
have engaged in religious or cultural practices since time
35
immemorial. Ceremonial practices were severely impacted by the
encroaching development that had prompted the enactment of the
36
37
NHPA. The section 106 process failed to address these impacts,
28. National Historic Preservation Act § 110, 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2.
29. National Historic Preservation Act § 106, 16 U.S.C. § 470f. Originally, the
statute required only federal agencies to consider effects on properties already
included in the National Register. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-422, tit. II,
§ 201(3), 90 Stat 1313, 1320 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470f). The statute
was amended in 1976 to include properties eligible for the National Register. Id.
30. National Historic Preservation Act § 201(a), 80 Stat. at 917 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470i).
31. See 16 U.S.C. § 470j.
32. Id. § 470f.
33. Id. § 470s.
34. NAT’ L PARK SERV., KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES: PROTECTING HISTORIC
PROPERTIES AND CULTURAL TRADITIONS ON INDIAN LANDS, at iii (1990) [hereinafter
KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES], available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/crdi/publications
/Keepers.htm.
35. See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 271–72 (3d
ed. 2003).
36. Id.; see also American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95–341, § 1, 92 Stat. 469 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006)).
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despite the congressional finding that “the historical and cultural
foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of
38
our community life.”
During the late 1970s, tribes lobbied for legal protections for
39
their religious practices, culminating in the American Indian
40
Religious Freedom Act of 1978. The Act was a catalyst for action
to explicitly recognize places of cultural significance in the section
41
106 process. In 1990, the U.S. Senate directed the National Park
Service to “report to the Committee on Appropriations on the
funding needs for the management, research, interpretation,
protection and development of sites of historical significance on
42
Indian lands.” The National Park Service responded with a
43
report and followed up with a guidance document, Bulletin 38,
44
the same year.
Bulletin 38 articulated the definition of traditional cultural
45
properties that became incorporated into the NHPA. It defines a
TCP as a property “eligible for inclusion in the National Register
because of its association with cultural practices or beliefs of a living
community that (a) are rooted in that community’s history, and
(b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural identity
46
of the community.” Nothing in Bulletin 38, or the following
NHPA amendments implementing the TCP concept, restricts TCP
designations to sites of importance to tribes, but in practice it is
tribes who primarily utilize TCP designations and Bulletin 38 was
47
written with the protection of tribal resources in mind.

37. KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES, supra note 34, at 69.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (emphasis added).
39. Marilyn Phelan, A History and Analysis of Laws Protecting Native American
Cultures, 45 TULSA L. REV. 45, 51–52 (2009).
40. American Indian Religious Freedom Act § 1, 92 Stat. 469.
41. BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 2–3. However, even the 1966 version laid the
groundwork for recognition of culturally significant places. See Patricia L. Parker,
Traditional Cultural Properties: What You Do and How We Think, 16 CULTURAL
RESOURCE M GMT., Special Issue, 1993, at 1, 2 (1993).
42. KEEPERS OF THE TREASURES, supra note 34, at i.
43. Id.
44. BULLETIN 38, supra note 5.
45. Id. at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
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Expanding the Scope of the NHPA: The 1992 Amendments

As a guidance document, Bulletin 38 does not carry the force
48
of law. Federal agencies were unresponsive to its suggestions, so
49
tribes lobbied for a legal mandate. The resulting 1992
amendments incorporated Bulletin 38’s definition of traditional
50
cultural properties. It specifically provided that
(A) Properties of traditional religious and cultural
importance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization may be determined to be eligible for
inclusion on the National Register.
(B) In carrying out its responsibilities under section
[106], a Federal agency shall consult with any Indian tribe
or Native Hawaiian organization that attaches religious
and cultural significance
to properties described in
51
subparagraph (A).
The amendments also provided for the protection of cultural
information that may be disclosed through consultation by allowing
52
federal officials to keep such information confidential.
Other provisions in the 1992 amendments strengthened the
role of tribes in the section 106 process by implicitly recognizing
53
the sovereignty of tribes over their own lands. The amended
NHPA established a process for the creation of Tribal Historic
Preservation Offices (THPOs), analogous to State Historic
54
Preservation Offices (SHPOs). The amendments also allowed a
tribe to apply its own historic preservation regulations in place of
48. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir.
1999). But see Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 862–63 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that the failure to follow Bulletin 38 violated ACHP regulations
that require the agency make a “reasonable and good faith effort” to identify
historic properties).
49. See Progress on Updating National Register Bulletin 38, NAT’ L PARK SERVICE
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nps.gov/nr/publications/guidance/TCP_Public
Comments/Tom_King_NRB_38_Reading_text.pdf (comments of Tom King, coauthor of Bulletin 38).
50. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4755–57 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) (2012)).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 4020, 106 Stat. at 4765 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470w-3).
53. See id. § 4006(a), 106 Stat. at 4755–57 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 470a(d)).
54. See id.
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ACHP regulations on tribal lands, as long as the tribe’s regulations
provided equivalent consideration to historic properties and the
55
ACHP agreed.
While it recognized the role of tribes in historic preservation,
the 1992 amendments also reaffirmed the ACHP’s advisory role,
clarifying that the Council has authority to “promulgate such rules
and regulations as it deems necessary to govern the implemen56
tation of section [106 of this Act] in its entirety.” The Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation remains the sole federal agency
authorized by statute to promulgate implementing regulations for
57
section 106.
III. THE SECTION 106 PROCESS
The Council’s implementing regulations create a series of
steps for the implementation of section 106, incorporating
provisions for traditional cultural properties and tribal consultation
58
from the NHPA’s 1992 amendments.
A. Initiating Section 106
The first step in the section 106 process is to determine
59
whether there is an undertaking that triggers section 106. The
statutory definition of undertaking includes projects that receive
60
federal funding or require a federal license. For example, the
Corps has responsibilities under section 106 when it issues a dredge
61
and fill permit under the Clean Water Act.
If there is an undertaking that has the potential to cause
62
adverse effects, the responsible federal agency must define the
55. Id.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 470s. See generally National Historic Preservation Act
Amendments of 1992 § 4018, 106 Stat. at 4763 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 470s) (inserting the phrase “in its entirety”).
57. See 16 U.S.C. § 470s; see also 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a)(2)(E)(i) (requiring
federal agency procedures to be consistent with the ACHP’s regulations).
58. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(a) (2013).
59. Id. § 800.3(a).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7); see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y).
61. See J. Cliff McKinney & William A. Eckert, Navigating Treacherous Waters:
The National Historic Preservation Act and the Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit, 8 ABA
WATER Q UALITY & WETLANDS COMMITTEE NEWSL ., Jan. 2009, at 12, 12.
62. 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a)(1) (“If the undertaking is a type of activity that does
not have the potential to cause effects on historic properties, assuming such
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63

“area of potential effect” (APE) of the project. The APE defines
64
the scope of the section 106 analysis. The ACHP defines the APE
as
the geographic area or areas within which an undertaking
may directly or indirectly cause alterations in the character
or use of historic properties, if any such properties exist.
The area of potential effects is influenced by the scale and
nature of an undertaking and may be different 65for
different kinds of effects caused by the undertaking.
Thus, the APE is intended to include more than the direct
66
“footprint” of a project. Indirect effects that should also be
67
considered include potential impacts to water quality, visual
68
69
effects, auditory effects, sociocultural effects, and effects on
70
plants and animals used for subsistence or religious purposes. The
scope of the affected area determines the geographic scope of the
71
section 106 analysis.
B.

Unique Considerations for Identifying TCPs

After defining the geographic scope of the section 106
analysis, the next step is to identify historic properties within the
72
APE. The section 106 analysis must include “any district, site,
building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for
73
inclusion in the National Register.”
historic properties were present, the agency official has no further obligations
under section 106 or this part.”).
63. Id. § 800.4(a)(1).
64. See id.
65. Id. § 800.16(d) (emphasis added).
66. THOMAS F. KING, CULTURAL RESOURCE LAWS AND PRACTICE 125 (3d ed.
2008).
67. Id.
68. Id.; see, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., COMMENTS OF THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION ON THE PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION BY
THE M INERALS M ANAGEMENT SERVICE FOR CAPE WIND ASSOCIATES , LLC TO
CONSTRUCT THE CAPE WIND ENERGY PROJECT ON HORSHOE SHOAL IN NANTUCKET
SOUND, M ASSACHUSETTS 2–3 (2010) (describing the importance of an unobstructed
view of the rising sun for ceremonies).
69. This could include changes in land use, tax rates, traffic, quality of life,
and economic activity. See KING, supra note 66, at 125.
70. Id.
71. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (2013).
72. Id. § 800.4(b).
73. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012) (emphasis added); see also Colo. River Indian
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74

Identifying TCPs is not a straightforward process. Ordinary
historical or archeological surveys are insufficient because the
75
cultural values that make TCPs significant are often intangible.
The features that define them may be rooted in the natural
76
landscape, yet sites sometimes retain their significance in spite of
77
substantial development. These characteristics are inconsistent
with the non-Native cultural conception of historic sites to the
extent that federal officials may deny the existence of a TCP even
78
when it objectively fits the criteria for a TCP designation.
This problem is exacerbated because TCPs must often be
identified through oral tradition, rather than exclusively through
79
documentary evidence. This puts the onus on tribes to ensure that
TCPs are included in the section 106 process, which creates
another conundrum: in the process of attempting to protect
culturally significant places, tribes may be forced to divulge
80
information that would ordinarily be reserved for a select few.
Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that all
property that meets the National Register criteria is “eligible property” under
section 106 and that a determination by the Secretary of Interior that the property
is likely to meet the National Register criteria is not required). The National
Register criteria are located at 36 C.F.R. § 60.4.
74. See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 2.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 14.
77. See, e.g., GWEN WESTERMAN & BRUCE WHITE , M NI SOTA M AKOCE : THE LAND
OF THE DAKOTA 214–15 (2012) (describing TCPs in Minnesota that have retained
their cultural significance even though they have been severely impacted by
development).
78. Compare Sacred Site and Traditional Cultural Property Analysis: Bureau of
Mines Twin Cities Research Center, NAT’ L PARK SERVICE 11–12 (Oct. 4, 2006)
[hereinafter Twin Cities Research Center], http://www.nps.gov/miss/parkmgmt
/upload/TCPCommentsFinal.pdf (rejecting TCP designation of Coldwater
Spring), with SUMMIT ENVIROSOLUTIONS, INC. & TWO PINES RES. GRP., LLC,
THE CULTURAL M EANING OF COLDWATER SPRING: FINAL ETHNOGRAPHIC RESOURCES
STUDY OF THE FORMER U.S. BUREAU OF M INES TWIN CITIES RESEARCH CENTER
PROPERTY, HENNEPIN COUNTY, M INNESOTA, at ii (2006), available at
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/miss/coldwater_spring.pdf
(recommending Coldwater Spring as eligible for TCP designation); see also
WESTERMAN & WHITE , supra note 77, at 215–18.
79. See Twin Cities Research Center, supra note 78, at 8–9 (doubting validity of
TCP based on lack of documentary evidence); see also BULLETIN 38, supra note 5,
at 12.
80. See, e.g., Russel L. Barsh, Grounded Visions: Native American Conceptions of
Landscapes and Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 127, 144–45 (2000) (discussing
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Although federal officials have authority to keep information
81
confidential under certain circumstances, these protections are
82
not always sufficient to reassure tribes. These issues are
exacerbated by commonplace mistrust and breakdowns in
83
communication between federal agencies and tribes.
Once a TCP has been identified, there are further difficulties
84
in defining its scope. As implied by the statutory definition,
85
historic properties can vary greatly in size. This is particularly true
for TCPs, which can vary from small, scattered parcels to cultural
86
districts spanning thousands of acres. Federal officials often find it
87
difficult to deal with large, nebulous historic landscapes. Some
require TCPs to have fixed boundaries even when those boundaries
88
are completely arbitrary. Commenting on the planned revision of
Bulletin 38, a consultant called the size and scale of TCPs
89
“intimidating.” The Bureau of Reclamation commented that TCPs
should be discrete, small locations that would be easier to
confidentiality concerns regarding survey of Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National
Forest).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 470w-3(a) (2012).
82. See Sarah Palmer et al., Strategies for Addressing Native Traditional Cultural
Properties, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’ T, Fall 2005, at 45, 49.
83. See S. Rheagan Alexander, Tribal Consultation for Large-Scale Projects: The
National Historic Preservation Act and Regulatory Review, 32 PACE L. REV. 895, 909–10
(2012).
84. See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 20.
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f; see also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES.,
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL LANDSCAPES IN THE SECTION 106 REVIEW PROCESS 1 (2012).
86. See Sara K. Van Norman, Protecting Off-Reservation Tribal Resources from State
and Federal Projects, in EMERGING ISSUES IN TRIBAL -STATE RELATIONS 7 (2013 ed.).
87. See, e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, Comments and Recommendations on the
National Register Bulletin 38: Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Traditional
Cultural Properties, NAT’ L PARK SERVICE 2 (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.nps.gov
/nr/publications/guidance/TCP_PublicComments/Bureau_of_Reclamation_10
_29_12.pdf (requesting that TCPs be clearly defined in space even if such
boundaries are arbitrary to tribes).
88. See Hoonah Indian Ass’n v. Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 1999)
(upholding a Forest Service decision to deny TCP status to the route of a survival
march because oral history revealed there were several routes (one for strong men
and another for women, children, and old people) and thus the route lacked a
single, concrete boundary). But see KING, supra note 66, at 126–27 (describing a
Corps decision that a TCP did not need to have boundaries).
89. Kelley L. Uyeoka, Comments on Identifying, Evaluating, & Documenting
Traditional Cultural Properties for NPS, available at http://www.nps.gov/nr
/publications/guidance/TCP_PublicComments/TCP_Comments_Uyeoka.pdf.
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90

manage. However, Bulletin 38 as it is currently written does allow
for defining arbitrary boundaries when it would otherwise be
91
impossible to proceed with a section 106 analysis.
C.

Predicting and Managing Adverse Effects

Once a historic site has been identified, the agency must
determine whether the project will have an adverse effect on the
92
property. The agency must consider the views of the consulting
parties, including tribes, and the public in making this
93
determination.
An adverse effect occurs when an undertaking directly or
indirectly alters any characteristic qualifying a property for the
94
National Register. The agency may consider effects that are far
away in distance or time, as well as cumulative effects, as long as the
95
effects are reasonably foreseeable.
If the agency determines there will be an adverse effect, then
the agency must consult with the SHPO or THPO and other
consulting parties to develop alternatives to avoid, minimize, or
96
mitigate the adverse effects. The ACHP must be given an
opportunity to comment on the proposed undertaking and suggest
97
mitigation measures. The ACHP could suggest denial of the
98
permit altogether, but it is up to the agency to decide whether to
99
implement the ACHP’s suggestions. The consultation process may

90. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 87, at 7.
91. See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 20–21.
92. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a) (2013).
93. See id.
94. Id. § 800.5(a)(1).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 800.6(a).
97. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 800.9(c)(2)(i) (“[T]he Council
shall provide the agency official with . . . any possible mitigation of the adverse
effects.”).
98. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.9(i) (“[T]he Council shall provide the agency official
with its opinion as to whether circumstances justify granting assistance to the
applicant.”).
99. See, e.g., Quechan Indian Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v.
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that it
was lawful for the Bureau of Reclamation to transfer “land[s] on which no eligible
sites were found” and only retain lands where eligible sites were found pending
completion of the section 106 process).
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also culminate in a memorandum of agreement between the
100
parties on how the undertaking will proceed.
Although initial consultation is required, consultation may be
terminated if the agency, ACHP, SHPO, or THPO determines “that
101
further consultation will not be productive.” The agency still
102
must consider the ACHP’s comments in making a final decision.
Historic properties are sometimes discovered during the
103
course of an undertaking. If there are no prior plans that cover
the treatment of these properties, the agency must “make
reasonable efforts to avoid, minimize, or mitigate [impacts] to such
104
properties.”
IV. AREAS OF REGULATORY CONTRADICTION
The National Historic Preservation Act grants the ACHP, and
only the ACHP, the authority to promulgate implementing
105
regulations. The ACHP has, in turn, delegated the authority to
other federal agencies to implement alternate procedures for the
section 106 process, substituting them for the ACHP’s
106
regulations. But this does not mean that federal agencies can
implement wildly different section 106 programs. The procedures
must be consistent with the ACHP’s regulations, and the agency
107
must obtain ACHP approval.
The Corps did promulgate its own section 106 regulations in
the 1980s, codified as “Appendix C” to the Corps’ regulations on
108
processing permits. However, there is no record that the ACHP
109
has approved Appendix C, and Appendix C conflicts with the
100. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c).
101. Id. § 800.7(a).
102. See id. § 800.6(c); City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
103. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 800.13; Pres. Coal. of Erie Cnty. v. Fed. Transit
Admin., 129 F. Supp. 2d 551, 562 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
104. 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b).
105. See 16 U.S.C. § 470s (2012).
106. 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(a); Protection of Historic Properties, 65 Fed. Reg.
77,698, 77,723 (proposed Dec. 12, 2000) (final rule codified as amended at
36 C.F.R. § 800).
107. 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(a).
108. See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,206, 41,236 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325
app. C (2013)).
109. Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 163 F.
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110

ACHP’s regulations in several respects. In 2005, the Corps issued
111
interim guidance that improves on some of these areas of
contradiction, but even this guidance continues to contradict key
112
provisions of the ACHP’s regulations.
A. Geographic Scope of Analysis
One serious inconsistency is the Corps’ definition of the “area
113
of potential effect” (APE). The ACHP defines the APE as “the
geographic area or areas within which an undertaking may directly
or indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic
114
properties.” In contrast, the Corps limits the APE to the “permit
115
area.”
The Corps may have limited its analysis to the permit area
based on case law that arose under a different statute, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Like the NHPA, NEPA is a
116
procedural statute, but it imposes broader environmental review
117
requirements than the NHPA. Two cases decided in 1980,
118
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray in the Eighth Circuit and Save
119
the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Fifth Circuit,
Supp. 2d 776, 792 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
110. See infra Part IV.A–E.
111. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’ RS, REVISED INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR
IMPLEMENTING APPENDIX C OF 33 CFR PART 325 WITH THE REVISED ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION REGULATIONS AT 36 CFR PART 800 (2005),
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory
/InterimGuidance_25apr05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE ].
112. See infra text accompanying notes 134–35, 164–65, 187.
113. See Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 789, 791–92.
114. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(d) (2013) (emphasis added).
115. See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(f) (2013).
116. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980). Since NEPA also requires analysis of historic and cultural resources, the
ACHP regulations allow a section 106 analysis to be undertaken concurrently with
NEPA. 36 C.F.R. § 800.8.
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (2006) (stating a declaration of environmental
policy which, among many things, “assure[s] for all Americans safe, healthful,
productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings”).
118. 621 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1980) (determining that the Corps was only
required to consider environmental impacts to navigable waters, not entire
transmission line, even though the transmission line would not be possible without
the Corps permit).
119. 610 F.2d 322, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the Corps was not
required to consider environmental impacts of entire manufacturing plant when
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allowed the Corps to limit the scope of its environmental review
under NEPA to the Corps’ traditional area of jurisdiction: waters of
the United States—or the “permit area”—of a project. A few years
120
later, the Corps issued Appendix B to its regulations, which
121
essentially codified Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska and Save the Bay.
122
Appendix B was controversial, but the Council on Environmental
Quality, which has rulemaking authority under NEPA, approved
123
the regulations.
124
Appendix C was issued around the same time as Appendix B,
and the Corps likely extended its rationale for limiting the scope of
analysis under NEPA to limiting the APE under the NHPA. Several
courts have also extended NEPA principles to the NHPA because
125
there is much more NEPA case law to draw upon. However,
extending NEPA case law to the NHPA in the context of section
106 would be a mistake.
The NHPA’s 1992 amendments put traditional cultural
properties (TCPs) under the statute’s protection and explicitly
126
require federal agencies to consider impacts to TCPs. Even if the
Corps argues that its jurisdiction is constitutionally limited to
127
“waters of the United States,” Congress can invoke its jurisdiction
over Indian affairs to require the Corps to consider impacts on
128
TCPs. Requiring federal agencies to consider impacts to TCPs
granting pipeline construction permit).
120. Environmental Quality, Procedures for Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 49 Fed. Reg. 1387 (proposed Jan. 11, 1984).
Unlike the NHPA, NEPA allows federal agencies to promulgate regulations to
bring agency practices in line with the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 4333.
121. Environmental Quality; Procedures for Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 53 Fed. Reg. 3120-01, 3122 (Feb. 3, 1988) (final
rule) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 230; § 325 app. B (2013)).
122. The Environmental Protection Agency opposed the Corps’ proposal
and the matter was referred to the Council on Environmental Quality.
See Implementation of National Environmental Policy Act; Council
Recommendations, 52 Fed. Reg. 22517-02, 22518 (June 12, 1987).
123. Id. at 22520.
124. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41206-01 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C).
125. See, e.g., Ringsred v. City of Duluth, 828 F.2d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that because parking ramp construction was not a NEPA “major Federal
action[],” it must not be a NHPA “undertaking” either).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) (2012).
127. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 741 (2006).
128. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201–02 (2004) (explaining that
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effectively expanded their jurisdictional authority, ensuring federal
programs are consistent with the United States’ trust responsibility
129
toward tribes. Because the federal government has constitutional
power over Indian affairs, the Corps cannot claim that
jurisdictional limitations preclude consideration of TCPs outside of
the “permit area.”
The only published NHPA case on point invalidated the
130
Corps’ limited definition of the area of potential effect (APE).
When Appendix C was still in the proposal stage, a California
district court held that the Corps’ reliance on its proposed
131
regulations was contrary to the statutory language of the NHPA.
The court directed the Corps to instead rely on the ACHP’s
132
definition of the APE.
133
Yet the Corps went on to finalize its rule the following year.
In its 2005 interim guidance, the Corps reiterated its intention to
134
continue limiting the scope of the APE. The guidance specifically
135
referenced and disregarded the ACHP’s regulations.
jurisdiction over relations with other sovereigns, including Indian nations, is
vested in the federal government through the “necessary concomitants of
nationality”). Although the doctrine of plenary power has been repeatedly
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as granting Congress total control over
Indian affairs, this article does not advocate for plenary power in its current form.
See Robert T. Coulter, The Plenary Power Doctrine, in NATIVE LAND LAW § 6.13 (West,
Westlaw 2013) (“[In early decisional law, t]he plenary power doctrine simply
referred to the fact that the Constitution gave the limited powers that the federal
government could exercise in relation to Indian nations to Congress and left no
residual powers to the states.”).
129. See generally Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal
Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. M ICH. J.L. REFORM 417 (2013) (describing
federal common law and statutory sources of the trust responsibility).
130. Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1441 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (preliminarily enjoining the Corps from issuing a permit for the placement
of riprap). The only other case on point is McGehee v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
in which the court decided the regulations did not conflict in that particular case.
Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–160–H, 2011 WL 2009969, at *5 (W.D. Ky. May 23,
2011).
131. Colo. River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1437; see also 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
132. Colo. River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1437.
133. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified as amended at 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C
(2013)).
134. 2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE , supra note 111, at (6)(d) (“The definition of
‘permit area’ in Appendix C . . . should continue to be used.”).
135. Id.
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Identification of Historic Properties

The ACHP’s regulations require agencies to consult with tribes
136
in the process of identifying historic properties within the APE.
This is another area where the Corps has enumerated exceptions in
137
an attempt to limit its section 106 responsibilities. Appendix C
provides for three situations in which the district engineer may
unilaterally determine that there is little likelihood that historic
properties exist or may be affected: (1) areas that have been
extensively modified by previous work, (2) areas created in modern
times, and (3) work that is so limited in scope that it is unlikely to
138
affect historic properties even if they were present. The ACHP’s
regulations provide for the third exception, but not for the first
139
two.
Appendix C’s first exception, areas modified by previous work,
potentially excludes TCPs from analysis. A TCP may retain its
cultural and historic significance even after development
140
significantly modifies the area. Since the Corps’ regulations do
not mention the concept of TCPs, there is even more danger that
141
TCPs may be left out of a Corps section 106 analysis. TCPs can be
easily overlooked absent proper consultation, since the cultural
142
values that make a TCP significant are often intangible.
C.

Determination of Adverse Effects

Another way Appendix C limits the Corps’ responsibility is by
143
narrowing the definition of adverse effects. The ACHP has
provided for an expansive definition of adverse effect:

136. 36 C.F.R. 800.4(b) (2013).
137. See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(3)(b).
138. Id.
139. 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a)(1).
140. See, e.g., WESTERMAN & WHITE , supra note 77, at 214–15 (describing TCPs
in Minnesota that have retained their cultural significance even though they have
been severely impacted by development).
141. SOC’ Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, REMARKS ON THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’
NOTICE OF INTENT AND REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS FOR THE RETROSPECTIVE
REVIEW OF REGULATIONS AT 33 CFR 320–332 AND 334 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
13563 (2012), available at http://www.saa.org/Portals/0/SAA/GovernmentAffairs
/SAA_APPENDIXC_REVIEW_2012.pdf.
142. BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 14.
143. See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15).
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when an undertaking may alter, directly or indirectly, any of
the characteristics of a historic property that qualify the
property for inclusion in the National Register in a
manner that would diminish the integrity of the
property’s location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or association . . . . Adverse effects may
include reasonably foreseeable effects caused by the
undertaking that may occur
later in time, be farther removed in
144
distance or be cumulative.
The ACHP’s regulations list several examples of potential
145
adverse effects, including visual, atmospheric, or auditory effects.
The ACHP’s regulations also specifically provide that transfer,
lease, or sale of the property out of federal ownership or control
may be an adverse effect, unless there are legally enforceable
conditions to ensure long-term preservation of the property’s
146
historic character.
In contrast, the Corps provides three exceptions where an
effect will not be considered adverse: (1) where the property only
has research value and that value can be substantially preserved by
conducting research, (2) when the undertaking is limited to
rehabilitation of buildings and structures, or (3) when the
undertaking is limited to the transfer, lease, or sale of historic
147
property.
The research exception in the Corps’ regulations is out of
date. In 1986, the year Appendix C was adopted, the ACHP’s
148
regulations also contained a research exception, but the ACHP
149
eliminated this exception in 1999.
The destruction of an
archeological site or another property with research value is now
150
unambiguously an adverse effect under the ACHP’s regulations.
The regulations do provide that an agency may comply with the
Archeological and Historic Preservation Act in the place of the
NHPA when a property is valued solely for its scientific or
archeological data, but this provision only covers post-review
151
discoveries.
Therefore, the Corps’ blanket exception for
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Id. § 800.5(a)(2).
Id. § 800.5(a)(2)(vii).
33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15)(c).
See KING, supra note 25, at 73.
Id.
Id.
36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(2).
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properties of pure research value is out of sync with the current
152
ACHP regulations.
D. Tribal Consultation
Consultation with tribes is an integral component of the
153
common law federal trust responsibility. Effective consultation is
also crucial to achieving the goal of cultural resource protection
154
under section 106 because consultation is often the only way to
155
identify TCPs.
The ACHP’s regulations incorporate the tribal consultation
156
requirements of the 1992 amendments. Any tribe that attaches
cultural significance to a property that “may be affected by an
undertaking,” regardless of the location of the historic property,
157
should be included as a consulting party.
This includes
consultation on the scope of the APE, the identification and
evaluation of historic properties, the potential effects of the
undertaking on the properties, and the resolution of adverse
158
effects.
Appendix C provides only that tribes may be consulted as part
159
of the district engineer’s investigations. Its language does not
160
require consultation with tribes at any point. Where tribes are

152. Compare 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15)(c) (providing three exceptions
for undertakings that would otherwise be considered adverse), with 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.5(a) (describing potential adverse effects without providing exceptions).
153. See generally Routel & Holth, supra note 129.
154. Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395, 1408 (D. Ariz. 1990).
155. See Dean B. Suagee & Jack F. Trope, Protection of Native American Sacred
Places on Federal Lands, 54 ROCKY M NT. M IN. L. INST. 12-1, § 12.02[2][c] (2008).
156. Compare National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006, 106 Stat. 4600, 4755–57 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 470A(d)(1)(C) (2012)) (“The Secretary shall consult with Indian
tribes, other Federal agencies, State Historic Preservation Officers, and other
interested parties . . . .”), with 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (discussing
consultation on tribal lands in the absence or presence of an appointed THPO
and the consultation on historic properties of significance).
157. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A).
159. 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(e) (2013) (“[I]nvestigations may consist of . . .
further consultations with . . . Indian tribes . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. § 325,
app. C(9)(a) (“[M]ay coordinate . . . with . . . any appropriate Indian tribe . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
160. See id. § 325 app. C.
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mentioned, they are referred to on similar terms as other
161
interested parties.
Appendix C weakens requirements for not only (non-THPO)
tribal consultation, but also consultation with the SHPO or THPO
162
in the process of determining the APE. Under the ACHP’s
regulations, agencies are required to consult with the SHPO or
163
THPO when defining the APE. But the Corps’ interim guidance
provides only that “[t]he district engineer can, in unusual or
complex projects, seek the views of the SHPO/THPO before
164
making the final determination.”
Where the limitation of
“unusual or complex projects” originates, or what it means, is a
165
mystery.
When it comes to identification of historic properties, the
ACHP’s regulations require the agency official to consult not only
with the SHPO or THPO, but with “any Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization that might attach religious and cultural
166
significance to properties within the area of potential effects.”
Consultation should be initiated “early in the undertaking’s
planning, so that a broad range of alternatives may be considered
167
during the planning process.” The ACHP also specifies that the
agency official should consider applicable tribal laws when
168
identifying historic properties.
The Corps’ regulations, in
contrast, do not mention tribes (or even THPOs) in the context of
identifying historic properties. Appendix C merely requires that the
district engineer consult with the SHPO and “other appropriate
169
sources of information.”
Appendix C further limits consultation requirements when the
district engineer determines there is little likelihood that historic
170
properties exist or will be affected. In such cases, Appendix C
requires the district engineer only to provide public notice

161. See, e.g., id. § 325 app. C(4)(a) (public notice will be sent to tribes).
162. See id. § 325 app. C(5)(f) (limiting investigation to the permit area with
no provision for consultation).
163. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a).
164. 2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE , supra note 111, at (6)(d).
165. See id.
166. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b).
167. Id. § 800.1(c).
168. Id. § 800.4(b)(1).
169. 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(3)(a) (2013).
170. Id. § 325 app. C(3)(b).
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171

explaining the determination. Considering that the district
engineer might not consult with tribes in defining the area of
potential effect, this means a tribe might not find out that the
172
undertaking affects a TCP until the public notice stage.
Public notice is not an adequate procedure for government173
to-government consultation,
which is most effective when
commenced as early as possible in the federal decision-making
174
process.
Additionally, Appendix C limits consideration of
properties that are discovered during the public comment stage:
“The evidence must set forth specific reasons for the need to further
175
investigate within the permit area . . . .” This language may be
merely an attempt to reword the ACHP’s regulation for properties
discovered post-review, which requires an agency official to specify
the National Register criteria used to assume the property is
176
eligible for section 106 analysis. But the language of Appendix C
implies that it is the interested party who must supply specific
reasons to investigate further, even when concerns arise during the
177
initial review process. This places an unnecessary burden on

171. Id.
172. See id.
173. See Routel & Holth, supra note 129, at 456 (“There is a fundamental
difference between the public participation process (notice and comment), which
is an information-gathering exercise, and consultation, which is a government-togovernment process that requires greater involvement in decision making by
Indian tribes.”). See generally 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (defining consultation as the
process of seeking, discussing, and considering the views of other participants,
and, where feasible, seeking agreement with them).
174. See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, Consulting with Tribes for Off-Reservation Projects,
25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’ T, Summer 2010, at 54, 56; Walker & de Bie, supra
note 7, at 5-15; Carol Berry, Pipeline Creates Tribal Dissent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2010
/09/27/pipeline-creates-tribal-dissent-81747.
175. 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(a) (emphasis added).
176. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(c) (2013) (“The agency official . . . may assume a
newly-discovered property to be eligible for the National Register for purposes of
section 106. The agency official shall specify the National Register criteria used to
assume the property’s eligibility so that information can be used in the resolution
of adverse effects.”).
177. See 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(5)(a) (“When the initial review, addition
submissions by the applicant, or response to the public notice indicates the
existence of a potentially eligible property, the district engineer shall examine the
pertinent evidence . . . .”).
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tribes who may not have been adequately informed prior to the
178
public comment stage.
Both the ACHP’s and the Corps’ regulations allow for
termination of consultation where consultation proves
179
unproductive. But the two regulations specify different terms
180
under which termination may occur. The ACHP’s regulations
allow termination only when consultation to resolve adverse effects
181
has been attempted and failed.
Any party may terminate
182
consultation, including the tribe. If it is the agency that chooses
to terminate consultation, the agency official must provide the
183
ACHP an opportunity to comment. Although the Corps can
terminate consultation under Appendix C, there is no mention of
184
other parties terminating consultation. Furthermore, Appendix
C discusses ACHP comments, but does not explicitly say that the
185
Corps must provide the ACHP with the opportunity to comment.
The Corps took steps to correct these problems by including
provisions on tribal consultation in its 2005 interim guidance, but
the guidance still lacks detail on when and how consultation should
186
occur during the section 106 process. The Department of
187
188
Defense and the Corps have also issued guidance documents,
189
pursuant to executive order,
that broadly define tribal
178. See id. § 325 app. C(3)(b).
179. Compare 36 C.F.R. § 800.7(a) (“After consulting to resolve adverse effects
pursuant to § 800.6(b)(2), the agency official, the SHPO/THPO, or the Council
may determine that further consultation will not be productive and terminate
consultation.”), with 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(8) (“The district engineer will
terminate any consultation immediately upon determining that further
consultation is not productive.”).
180. Compare 36 C.F.R. § 800.7(a), with 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(8).
181. 36 C.F.R. § 800.7(a).
182. Id.
183. Id. § 800.7(a)(1).
184. 33 C.F.R. § 324 app. C(8).
185. See id.
186. 2005 INTERIM GUIDANCE , supra note 111, at 1, ¶ 2. The guidance refers to
the government-to-government relationship between tribes and the federal
government and specifies that public notice alone is inadequate consultation. Id.
187. U.S. DEP’ T OF DEF., AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POLICY (2012).
The Corps of Engineers is a component of the Department of Defense.
188. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’ RS, TRIBAL CONSULTATION POLICY (2012); see also
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’ RS, CONSULTING WITH TRIBAL NATIONS: GUIDELINES FOR
EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION WITH TRIBAL PARTNERS (2010).
189. See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000);
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consultation procedures, but these documents are not specific to
190
section 106.
In practice, the Corps’ guidance on tribal
191
consultation has been applied inconsistently, perhaps because
192
agency guidance is less enforceable than legislative rules.
E.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality is a major concern for tribes seeking protection
193
of traditional cultural properties. When the public becomes
informed about the location and character of a sacred site, the site
194
may be subject to desecration, and religious practitioners may
195
fear for their privacy and safety. Even absent this threat, there
may be cultural concerns with disclosing the location of sacred
196
sites. This kind of information may be privileged to the extent
that it is reserved for only a certain segment of the tribe’s
197
population. Tribes may be so reluctant to divulge information
about sacred places that they may delay action until faced with the
198
possibility of complete destruction of the site. By the time such
destruction is imminent enough to warrant divulging privileged
information, it may be too late in the section 106 process to protect
199
the site.

Memorandum: Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009).
190. See U.S. DEP’ T OF DEF., supra note 188; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’ RS,
CONSULTING WITH TRIBAL NATIONS: GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION WITH
TRIBAL PARTNERS, supra note 188; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’ RS, TRIBAL
CONSULTATION POLICY, supra note 188.
191. See SOC’ Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, supra note 141.
192. United States v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th
Cir. 1982). See generally 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD M URPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:63 (West, Westlaw, 3d ed. 2014).
193. See Palmer et al., supra note 82, at 45.
194. See, e.g., Beth Kampschror, In Pot-Hunter Country, A Small Effort at Healing,
SALT LAKE TRIB., (July 30, 2009), http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/ci_12949608.
195. See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 861 n.5 (10th Cir.
1995).
196. See BULLETIN 38, supra note 5, at 19.
197. Charles W. Smythe, The National Register Framework for Protecting Cultural
Heritage Places, 26 GEO. WRIGHT F. 14, 19 (2009); see, e.g., Dussias, supra note 4,
at 68 (“Because of the belief that such sites and their locations should not be
discussed with outsiders, the Tribe did not disclose the site’s existence until it
appeared there was no other choice.”).
198. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 4, at 68.
199. See Progress on Updating National Register Bulletin 38, supra note 49.
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To mitigate this problem, the NHPA and the ACHP’s
regulations require agency officials to take confidentiality concerns
200
into account during the process of identifying historic properties.
The agency is required to withhold information about the location,
character, or ownership of a historic property from documentation
“when disclosure may cause a significant invasion of privacy[,] risk
of harm to the historic property[,] or impede the use of a
201
traditional religious site by its practitioners.”
In contrast, Appendix C only protects information from
disclosure when there is a “substantial risk of harm, theft, or
202
destruction.” This provision does not include language that
protects the integrity of TCPs for the purpose of cultural
203
practices. While destruction of property is one cause of concern
204
for tribes, the cultural uses of a TCP are often significant. Thus,
cultural uses of a property warrant protection, as provided for in
205
the ACHP’s regulations.
V. UNAUTHORIZED DELEGATION

OF RULEMAKING

AUTHORITY

Since Appendix C is inconsistent with the Protection of
Historic Properties regulations under 36 C.F.R. section 800, at
least three district courts have enjoined the Corps from using
206
Appendix C. This calls the legality of the Corps’ implementing
200. See National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992 § 4020,
16 U.S.C. § 470w-3 (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c) (2013). Even the ACHP’s
regulations may be inadequate to protect confidentiality. Protection of Historic
Properties, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,698, 77,714–15 (proposed Dec. 12, 2000) (final rule
codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. § 800) (pointing out tribal confidentiality issues
in proposed rule).
201. 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c)(1).
202. 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(4)(c) (2013).
203. See id.
204. See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 4, at 68 (describing importance of site for
religious ceremonies).
205. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c)(1).
206. See Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (invalidating Corps definition of “permit area” in Appendix C, which was a
proposed regulation at the time); Comm. to Save Cleveland’s Huletts v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 163 F. Supp. 2d 776, 791–92 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (voiding permit
the Corps issued without waiting for ACHP comment); Slayer Park Vill. Council v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. C-1-02-832, 2003 WL 22423202, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 17, 2003) (permanently enjoining construction permit because Corps
improperly terminated consultation). But see Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623,
636 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Corps could follow a provision in
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regulations into question, creating an uncertainty that not only
impacts tribes, but impedes the ability of project developers to plan
207
effectively.
Even if the ACHP did authorize the Corps to promulgate its
208
own regulations, the legality of such a delegation is dubious. For
regulations to carry the force of law, Congress must first delegate
regulatory authority to the promulgating agency, either explicitly
209
or implicitly. Authority to promulgate regulations can only come
210
from an authorizing and empowering statute. A federal agency
211
does not have independent legislative power. Thus, the Council
212
cannot grant rulemaking authority, only Congress can.
It could be argued that by delegating general authority over
section 106 to the ACHP, Congress also delegated the authority to
further delegate. In that case, a Chevron analysis would be
213
required. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council requires
deference to agency interpretation of statutes, but only when a two214
part test has been satisfied. First, the provision of the statute
interpreted by the agency must be ambiguous, such that the agency
is filling in the blanks left by Congress rather than rewriting the
215
law. If there is ambiguity in the statute, then the question
becomes whether the agency’s regulation is a permissible
216
construction of the statute.
Courts defer to an agency’s
construction of statutory ambiguity unless the agency’s
217
interpretation is arbitrary and capricious.
Appendix C that allows the Corps to rely on a lead agency in complying with the
NHPA); McGehee v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:11-CV-160-H, 2011 WL
2009969, at *5 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011) (holding that the ACHP and Corps
definitions of the APE did not conflict under the circumstances).
207. See McKinney & Eckert, supra note 61, at 13.
208. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 132 (2004).
209. Id. § 131.
210. Id. § 130.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See 4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD M URPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW &
PRACTICE § 11:30 (West, Westlaw, 3d ed. 2014).
214. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
215. See id. at 843–45.
216. Id.
217. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court recently extended this analysis to the scope
of an agency’s regulatory authority. Under City of Arlington v. FCC, when a statute
delegates general rulemaking authority to an agency, the agency is entitled to
Chevron deference in determining the scope of its regulations. 133 S. Ct. 1863,
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Although the Chevron test grants significant deference to
agency rulemaking, in practice the outcome of Chevron deference is
218
so inconsistent that it has been called a lottery. Much comes
219
down to step one of the Chevron analysis: statutory interpretation.
A textualist is much less likely to find statutory ambiguity than an
220
intentionalist.
Applying a textualist approach, the NHPA authorizes the
Council “to promulgate such rules and regulations as it deems
necessary to govern the implementation of section [106] in its
221
222
entirety.” This is a broad grant of general authority. It could be
argued that if the Council deems it necessary to delegate
rulemaking power, the plain meaning of the statue gives the
223
Council the power to do so. But applying the ordinary rules of
statutory interpretation, delegation to one authority excludes
224
delegation to another. If Congress intended to delegate authority
to other agencies besides the ACHP, it would have done so
225
explicitly. In fact, Congress did specify that the ACHP may
226
delegate authority to tribes under certain circumstances. The fact
that Congress explicitly provided for delegation to tribes indicates

1868 (2013). Still, even in City of Arlington, Congress has to delegate power to the
agency in the first place. See id. at 1874 (emphasizing that Congress granted FCC
general authority to administer the statute at issue).
218. See Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2013) (an
empirical study of the application of Chevron in practice).
219. Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive’s
Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 149 (2012).
220. Id. at 175–77.
221. 16 U.S.C. § 470s (2012) (emphasis added).
222. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
223. See Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1896 (2013) (quoting Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) (holding
that when a statute’s language is plain, the court should enforce it according to its
terms); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 67 (2012).
224. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953 (2013) (quoting Andrus v.
Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)) (applying the canon of expressio
unius: the mention of one thing in a statute excludes another); 73 AM. JUR. 2D
Statutes § 120.
225. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341
(2005) (“We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text
requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply.”).
226. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006(a), 106 Stat. 4600, 4755–57 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(5)).
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that Congress intentionally decided not to delegate authority to
227
other federal agencies.
The legislative history behind NHPA and its 1992 amendments
also show that ACHP’s delegation of its own rulemaking authority
228
violates legislative intent. The Council was created for the express
and sole purpose of overseeing implementation of the National
229
Historic Preservation Act. The statutory language of the 1992
amendments reaffirmed the ACHP’s authority over the section 106
230
process. The amendments were added to “clarif[y] that it is the
responsibility of the Advisory Council to promulgate such rules and
regulations it deems necessary to govern the implementation of
231
section 106 of NHPA in its entirety.” The congressional record
emphasizes that “the ACHP has the authority to define . . . how
agencies should take effects on historic properties into account in
232
their planning.” Thus, both the text of the statute and its
legislative history show that Congress intended to delegate
authority to the ACHP and the ACHP only.
VI. SOLUTIONS
A. Regulatory Fix
The most straightforward solution to the problem of
contradictory regulations is to change the regulations themselves.
Some commentators, including the Society for American
Archaeology, have recommended repealing Appendix C

227. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 421 (2009).
228. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 83 for a discussion of the role of legislative
history in statutory interpretation.
229. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1916 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3307,
3307 (listing creation of the ACHP as part of the three-fold purpose of the NHPA,
along with creation of the National Register and the encouragement of local,
regional, state, and national interest in protecting historic properties); see also
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 87 (discussing the persuasiveness of committee reports in
statutory interpretation).
230. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4018, 106 Stat. 4600, 4762 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 470s) (adding the phrase “in its entirety” to the end).
231. S. REP. NO. 102-336 (1992), 1992 WL 429995, at *17.
232. 137 CONG. REC. S3564-02 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Fowler).
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233

altogether. Because there are many points of inconsistency, a
234
repeal would be the simplest and most comprehensive fix.
A less desirable solution would be to amend Appendix C, a
course of action the Corps has been considering since at least
235
2005. Amendments should eliminate the Corps’ definition of
236
“area of potential effect” and incorporate the ACHP’s definition.
The Corps should also eliminate the exceptions that allow the
district engineer to determine that historic properties are unlikely
to be present and the exceptions to what may be considered an
237
“adverse effect.”
There need to be stronger provisions for
confidentiality, and tribal consultation should be integrated
238
throughout the section 106 process. At minimum, the Corps
should promulgate regulations that would make enforceable the
239
consultation provisions already laid out in guidance documents.
Another alternative would be to repeal Appendix C and
negotiate a prototype programmatic agreement with the ACHP in
consultation with other stakeholders, including SHPOs, THPOs,
240
tribes, and the public. Prototype programmatic agreements are
meant to streamline the section 106 process to fit the needs of
233. See SOC’ Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, supra note 141.
234. See id.
235. Memorandum from Lawrence A. Lang, Acting Chief, Operations,
Directorate of Civil Works, to Major Subordinate Commands and Dist. Commands
(Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks
/regulatory/inter_guide2007.pdf.
236. Compare 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y) (2013) (“Area of potential effects means
the geographic area or areas within which an undertaking may directly or
indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic properties, if any
such properties exist. The area of potential effects is influenced by the scale and
nature of an undertaking and may be different for different kinds of effects caused
by the undertaking.”), with 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(1)(e) (2013) (“[A]n ‘effect’ on
a ‘designated historic property’ occurs when the undertaking may alter the
characteristics of the property that qualified the property for inclusion in the
National Register. Consideration of effects on ‘designated historic properties’
includes indirect effects of the undertaking. The criteria for effect and adverse
effect are described in Paragraph 15 of this appendix.”).
237. Compare 33 C.F.R. § 325 app. C(15)(b)(3) (describing exceptions when
impacts otherwise considered adverse may be found not adverse), with 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.5(a)(1) (containing no exceptions to the criteria for adverse effect).
238. See supra Part IV.D–E.
239. See 1 KOCH & M URPHY, supra note 192, § 4:63.
240. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(b)(4); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES.,
PROTOTYPE PROGRAMMATIC AGREEMENT GUIDANCE 2 (2012), available at http://www
.achp.gov/docs/guidance_prototype_agreements.pdf.
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241

particular programs. Once the ACHP authorizes the prototype,
the Corps can use its procedures to implement section 106 for
242
individual projects.
B.

Legislative Fix

The National Trust on Historic Preservation has published a
report that suggests the organic act of a federal agency affects its
243
implementation of section 106. The report points out that the
organic act of the Forest Service, which has a poor track record
under the NHPA, contains no mention at all of protecting historic
244
places. On the other hand, the organic act of the Bureau of Land
Management, an agency with a better reputation for protecting
245
historic properties, explicitly includes protection of historic sites.
Like the Forest Service, the Corps lacks any mandate in its
246
founding legislation to protect historic sites.
Protection of
historic places was not on Congress’s radar when it enacted
legislation to permanently establish an Army Corps of Engineers in
247
1802. The current mission of the Corps is “to strengthen our
Nation’s security, energize the economy and reduce risks from
248
disasters.”
This mission emphasizes economic development,
which is perhaps the impetus for the Corps’ stated regulatory policy
249
“to avoid unnecessary regulatory controls.” The general permit
program, which Appendix C is attached to, “is the primary method
250
of eliminating unnecessary federal control.”
If the Corps’ lack of compliance is rooted in its core mission,
then the solution should extend beyond Appendix C. Indeed, the
Corps has a track record of noncompliance that extends beyond
241. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., supra note 240.
242. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.14(b)(4); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., supra
note 240.
243. NAT’ L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM:
CULTURAL RESOURCES AT RISK 11 (May 2008). Congress created the National Trust
for Historic Preservation to facilitate public participation in historic preservation.
16 U.S.C. § 468 (2012).
244. NAT’ L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., supra note 243, at 11.
245. Id.
246. See Act of Mar. 16, 1802, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 132.
247. See id.
248. Mission and Vision, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’ RS, http://www.usace.army.mil
/About/MissionandVision (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
249. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(3) (2013).
250. Id.
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251

reliance on its own regulations. But when it comes to protection
of traditional cultural properties, the issue goes beyond
noncompliance with the NHPA. Even when following the ACHP’s
regulations, the agency official has discretion in whether to
252
approve or deny a permit. This ultimate decision may be
253
influenced by the mission of the agency. Thus, one component
of a comprehensive solution would be to enact legislation
254
incorporating historic preservation into the Corps’ core mission.
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Historic Preservation Act is the cornerstone of
255
historic resource protection in American law. In particular, it is
an important source of recognition for culturally significant
256
places.
The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation was
257
created to oversee the implementation of this mandate. Thus,
Congress gave the ACHP broad authority over the section 106
258
process. By promulgating and utilizing regulations that narrow its
section 106 responsibilities, the Corps of Engineers has violated
259
both the intent and the letter of the law. Not only does Appendix
260
C allow the Corps to avoid the section 106 review process, but it
may have the effect of excluding analysis of traditional cultural
261
properties as mandated by Congress.
The inconsistent
251. See, e.g., Lucus Ritchie, The Failure of the National Historic Preservation Act in
the Missouri River Basin and a Proposed Solution, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J.,
Spring 2005, at 1, 8–11 (describing the Corps of Engineer’s failure to comply with
a section 106 programmatic agreement, resulting in harm to several historic
properties, including exposure of a grave site).
252. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(“[S]ection 106 imposes no substantive standards on agencies, but it does require
them to solicit the Council’s comments . . . .”).
253. See NAT’ L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., supra note 243.
254. See id.
255. 138 CONG. REC. H11493-01 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Vento); Water E. Stern & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources and
Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development: A Practical Primer, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 133, 136 (1995).
256. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) (2012).
257. See id. §§ 470i, 470j.
258. Id.
259. See supra Part IV.
260. Id.
261. See National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992 § 4006(a),
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6).
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262

regulations also cause uncertainty for project developers. The
Corps’ authority to follow its own regulations may be successfully
263
challenged in court, further delaying a project.
The Corps’ regulations for section 106 may internally make
sense because they reflect the Corps’ own mission to promote
264
economic development. The Corps’ mission and authorizing
statutes do not integrate historic preservation into the agency’s
265
mandate. This is exactly the reason that the ACHP should be the
agency with sole authority to implement the NHPA—when other
agencies have conflicting missions, they are likely to prioritize other
266
values over historic preservation. Therefore, the best solution for
the problems created by these incongruent regulations is to repeal
267
Appendix C.

262.
263.
905–06
264.
265.
266.
267.

McKinney & Eckert, supra note 61, at 12.
See, e.g., Crutchfield v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 154 F. Supp. 2d 878,
(E.D. Va. 2001).
See Mission and Vision, supra note 248.
Id.
See NAT’ L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., supra note 243.
See SOC’ Y FOR AM. ARCHEOLOGY, supra note 141.
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